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The decision-making process underlying Crown authorization of natural resource industry 
activity may trigger an obligation on the part of the Crown to consult First Nations. Con-
sultation must accord with constitutional standards. Non-compliance can result in restric-
tion of previously authorized third party undertakings. This can be costly and harmful to 
the industry. This paper assesses the prospects of a cause of action against the Crown in 
negligence as a potential avenue of compensation for third parties who suffer loss as a result 
of inadequate Crown consultation. The analysis incorporates relevant facts from several 
recent cases regarding ‘Haida motions’ and concludes that, in certain circumstances, such 
an action could succeed. 
INTRODUCTION
The activities of the Canadian natural resource industry are necessarily intertwined 
with Aboriginal and treaty rights. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 [Consti-
tution Act, 1982]1 obligates the Crown, represented by the federal and provincial 
governments, to consult and potentially accommodate First Nations where author-
ized activities may affect their asserted Aboriginal rights. This duty to consult and 















    Director) [Taku].3 Lower courts 
have subsequently applied the Court’s rationale in Haida when handling First Na-
tion applications for declarations that the Crown has failed to discharge its duty to 
consult and accommodate. These applications are called ‘Haida motions.’ 
A successful Haida motion can suspend or restrict private party operations carried 
out under a Crown authorization insofar as the operations affect asserted Aboriginal 
or treaty rights.4 Such restraint is costly and therefore significant to industry. This 
raises the issue that is the subject of this paper - whether the Crown is liable in neg-
ligence to third parties for damages incurred as a result of inadequate consultation. 
An analysis of the elements of the tort suggests that such liability could arise. How-
ever, suing the Crown in tort raises unique issues and a straightforward negligence 
analysis is inappropriate. Nevertheless, it will be shown that, in the right circum-
stances, these issues do not ultimately bar a private party from obtaining compensa-
tion from the Crown for losses incurred as a result of inadequate consultation.






























































(2005), 251 D.L.R. (4th) 717, 2005 BCCA 128 [Musqueam].
482007
In order to illustrate the significant potential for damage to third parties resulting 
from a successful Haida motion, Part I gives a brief description of the circumstances 
that trigger the duty to consult and the extent of the Crown’s obligations where 
the duty is engaged. It will be shown that natural resource industry activities fre-
quently trigger this duty and that it carries extensive consultation obligations for 
the Crown with resultant risks for private parties who are themselves not respon-







    [Blaney],6 to exemplify the inequity to 
third parties that can result when the duty to consult is not recognized or adequate-
ly handled by the Crown. This inequity, it is argued, can be addressed by the tort 
of negligence. However, negligence is not the only possible avenue for recovery, a 
fact acknowledged in Part III which notes the potential applicability of breach of 
contract, the tort of misfeasance in a public office and restitution. Part IV works 
through the elements of Crown liability in negligence to third parties for damage 
incurred due to Crown failure to consult. To better explain the arguments on both 
sides, the analysis incorporates relevant facts from Blaney, Haida, Taku and another 







Third party loss resulting from a successful Haida motion can arise only where a 
consultation duty is triggered but not discharged. This duty arises from s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 19828 and has been defined in a line of Supreme Court of Canada 
authorities.9 Where First Nations assert10 or hold rights pursuant to s. 35 and these 
rights may be affected by government action or decision, an obligation to consult 
arises as a product of the Crown’s honour.11 The Supreme Court of Canada has 
been unequivocal in its assertion that this duty lies with the Crown, not private 
parties.12 
The duty to consult is triggered where two requirements are met. The first is that 
the Crown (1) must possess real or constructive knowledge of the possible existence 
5 
    Supra note 2 at paras. 53, 56. “[T]he ultimate legal responsibility for consultation and accommodation rests 
























    Supra note 1 at s. 35. Section 35 states that:






  (2) In this Act, “Aboriginal peoples of Canada” includes the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples 
  of Canada.
  (3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) “treaty rights” includes rights that now exist by way 




















    consultation. The duty to consult was expanded to interference 
with Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193. Haida and Taku, 
supra notes 2, 3, expanded the Crown duty to consult to cases where there is an asserted, not just a proven claim 
of Aboriginal or treaty rights.   
10 
    Supra note 2 at para. 25. Aboriginal rights held pursuant to treaties and potential rights held pursuant to Ab-
original claims were held to be protected by s. 35. Potential interference with all s. 35 rights carries a consultation 
and potential accommodation requirement.  
11 
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of Aboriginal right or title.  Secondly, the Crown must become involved in a deci-
sion-making process that has the potential to adversely affect that right or title.13 
In Taku, the provincial assessment of a proposed private party undertaking (the 
re-opening of a mine) pursuant to the British Columbian Environmental Assessment 
Act14 involved a decision about whether to approve a road through traditional Taku 
River Tlingit First Nation [TRTFN] territory. These circumstances were held to im-
plicate an ongoing treaty negotiation process and trigger a duty to consult. The 
first requirement was met because the TRTFN had made their claims known to the 
Crown through the B.C. Treaty Commission.15 The second requirement was also 
met because the environmental assessment involved the Crown in a decision-mak-
ing process that had the potential to adversely affect Aboriginal rights. The reason-
able apprehension of adverse effects on TRTFN rights lay in the fact that the pro-
posed road was to cut through claimed territory which was otherwise pristine. 
In Haida, the British Columbia provincial Crown decision to replace a private party 
tree farm licence pursuant to the provincial Forest Act16 on land to which the Haida 
Nation claimed title likewise triggered the duty to consult. The Crown was held to 
have had real or constructive knowledge of the possible existence of Aboriginal title 
because the Haida had claimed title to the land for over one hundred years. Further, 
the Crown’s decision to replace the licence was an action that would result in the 
cutting of trees on the claimed territory – an adverse effect on Haida resources and 
rights. 
The scope of the duty to consult will vary from case to case. Haida set out two fac-
tors that determine this scope: the strength of the Aboriginal claim, and the gravity 
of the possible negative effect on the claimed rights.17 The Court envisaged a spec-
trum of increasingly burdensome consultation requirements, varying positively 
with these factors.18 For example, the scope of the duty in Haida was held to be 
measurable to a standard of “significant accommodation.”19 This was because of the 
Haida’s strong claim to the right to harvest cedar and the direct interference with 
this right that logging would cause.20 The scope of the duty in Taku was also quite 
large. The TRTFN’s asserted claim was relatively strong by virtue of their involve-
ment in an ongoing treaty negotiation process. The proposed road also created 
great potential for adverse effects on traditional land use activities. Consequently, 
the TRTFN were entitled to “something significantly deeper than minimum con-
sultation and to a level of responsiveness to concerns that can be characterized as 
accommodation.”21 
13 
    Haida, supra note 2 at para. 64.
14 
    Environmental Assessment Act, S.B.C. 1996, c. 119 [EAA].
15 
    Taku, supra note 3 at para. 26.
16 
    Forest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 157.
17 
    Supra note 2 at para. 39.
18 
    Ibid. at paras.  43 and 44. “At one end of the spectrum lie cases where the claim to title is weak, the Aboriginal 
right limited, or the potential for infringement minor. In such cases, the only duty on the Crown may be to give 
notice, disclose information, and discuss any issues raised in response to the notice. At the other end of the spec-

































19 Ibid. at para. 77.
20 Ibid. at para. 77.
21 
    Supra note 3 at para. 32.
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In these two cases the factors which determined the scope of the duty to consult 
registered on the higher end of the spectrum. Yet, even where factors line up on the 
lowest end of the spectrum, the duty to consult requires, at the very least, good faith 
and reasonableness on the part of the Crown.22
This brief description of the context and content of the duty to consult demonstrates 
that in the natural resource industry the possible existence of a duty to consult is 
something to which the Crown must be alert. Where the Crown is not diligent, a 
First Nation may have a cause of action in the form of a Haida motion. A successful 







As previously discussed, a Haida motion is an application for a declaration that the 
Crown has failed to fully discharge its duty to consult and accommodate a First Na-
tion. The remedy sought is a court order requiring the Crown to perform constitu-
tionally adherent consultation and accommodation. On successful Haida motions, 
courtsmay enjoin the operations of private parties for which government authoriza-
tion has already been granted.
The Blaney decision is an example of the application of an injunctive remedy arising 
from a successful Haida motion in the context of a tangible resource sector situation. 
In this case, the provincial Minister of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries had granted 
an existing fish farm proprietor, Marine Harvest Canada, an amendment to its fish 
farm licence. The amendment, granted pursuant to the provincial Fisheries Act,23 al-
lowed Marine Harvest to add one million Atlantic salmon to its farm, where previ-
ously only Pacific salmon had been reared. Marine Harvest had already introduced 
700,000 Atlantic salmon smolts when the Homalco Indian Band [Homalco] applied 
for judicial review of the Ministry’s decision to authorize this activity. The Homalco 
brought a Haida motion as part of their suit. At issue was whether the Crown had 
adequately consulted with them with respect to the authorization of the license 
amendment.
The British Columbia Supreme Court held that a duty to consult had been trig-
gered and that the Crown had not discharged its duty since it had never met with 
the Homalco. The scope of the duty was next determined to be mid-spectrum. The 
Crown was required to meet with the Homalco personally, engage in discussion of 
their concerns, and provide authentic responses to these concerns.24
The Crown’s failure to discharge its duty adversely affected Marine Harvest. Marine 
Harvest was enjoined from adding the remaining 300,000 Atlantic salmon smolts 
it had already obtained while the Crown fulfilled its obligation to consult with the 
Homalco. However Marine Harvest did not have anywhere to house the smolts, 
and the cost of securing accommodation for them was considerable. Furthermore, 
Marine Harvest could not be sure of getting its licence amendment even after the 
Crown had fulfilled its obligation to consult with the Homalco since the Minister 
22 
    Supra note 2 at para. 41.
23 
    Fisheries Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 149.
24 
    Supra note 6.
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was ordered to “approach the consultation with an open mind and to be prepared 
to withdraw its approval of the amendment based on the consultation process.”25 
Marine Harvest had invested in infrastructure upgrades to accommodate the addi-
tional fish, and restriction of its planned expanded activity would reduce its invest-
ment to loss. The inequity of this situation is readily apparent. A private party in the 







Negligence is not the only potential recovery mechanism for private parties like 
Marine Harvest. Although a full consideration of each potential mechanism is be-
yond the scope of this paper, several potential causes of action warrant mention. 
Circumstances may allow for private party compensation on the bases of breach of 
contract, the tort of misfeasance in a public office or restitution.
Where Crown authorization is embodied in a legally enforceable contract and the 
Crown must breach that contract as a result of an order to consult, standard con-
tractual remedies would be available. For example, there would be a potential ac-
tion for breach of contract on the facts in cases such as Musqueam.26 In this case, the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal suspended the sale of property by the Crown to 
a corporation pending consultation (the court found that the Crown had failed to 
consult in good faith). 
The tort of misfeasance in a public office could also provide a mechanism for recov-
ery, but only where a decision to issue an authorization without consultation was 
made on the basis of a deliberate attempt to shirk the duty to consult coupled with 
an awareness that such an attempt was likely to injure the issuee.27 The negligence 
analysis is therefore intended to explore a potential mechanism for recovery in cir-
cumstances of Crown ignorance or inadvertence falling outside the ambit of the tort 
of misfeasance in a public office.  










street], “[r]estitution is a tool of corrective justice. When a transfer of value between 
two parties is normatively defective, restitution functions to correct that transfer by 
restoring parties to their pre-transfer positions.”28 The relevance of this kind of tool 
to the inequity identified in this paper is obvious. 
Subsequent to the holding in Kingstreet, the law of restitution can provide com-
pensation for wrongdoing, unjust enrichment or on constitutional grounds.29 The 
wrongdoing category seems, however, to require bad faith30 and so may not be 
available to a private party. That is because Crown failure to consult will likely be 
25 
    Supra note 6 at para. 127.
26 
    Musqueam, supra note 4. 
27 

























































vires taxes enacted in good faith, it cannot be said that the government was acting as a ‘wrong-doer’.”
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the result of inadvertence rather than malice. Unjust enrichment is also of limited 
application. One of the basic requirements of the tort, enrichment of the defendant 
and corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff,31 can probably only be met in lim-
ited circumstances where the failure to consult results in restraint of private party 
undertakings.  Excepting any application fees paid out by the private party to the 
Crown, there is no retention of value on the part of the Crown obtained as a result 
of its authorization. 
Kingstreet is perhaps most pertinent for the principle that where third party loss 
results from unconstitutional taxation, the requirements for restitution are far less 
restrictive than they would be for unjust enrichment.32 Kingstreet may create the 
basis for private party recovery of damage experienced as a result of Crown issu-
ance of unconstitutional authorization without the need to resort to circumscribed 
private law principles. The objective is the same - restoring the party to the position 
it was in before the Crown’s unconstitutional activity. The underlying rationale also 
corresponds: “…the central concern must be to guarantee respect for constitutional 
principles.”33 It is a constitutional principle that the government shall not levy taxes 
without constitutional authority. The honour of the Crown is also a constitutional 
principle and creates a duty to consult in accordance with the meaning of s. 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. Ultimately, Crown non-compliance with either principle 
undermines the rule of law. The law of restitution may thus be of some use where 





Although other causes of action may exist, this paper identifies and focuses on 
negligence as a viable cause of action in circumstances where third party loss has 
resulted from the Crown’s failure to consult and accommodate First Nations. Two 
preliminary matters arise in this regard: the identity of the Crown, and the author-
ity by which tort actions may be brought against it. 
The duty to consult and accommodate lies with either the federal or provincial 
Crown.34 The two are legally distinct.35 A negligence analysis will therefore ap-
ply to either or both Crowns, depending on the circumstances. It is also clear that 
“Crown” refers to the executive and not the legislative branch of government.36 
Crown liability therefore results from executive decisions or authorizations.
The provincial and federal Crowns have exposed themselves statutorily to liability 
in negligence by means of the Crown Proceedings Act and the Crown Liability and 
Proceedings Act.37 Peter Hogg has noted that it was the Uniform Model Act of 1950 
31 
    Peter v. Beblow [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980 at 987.
32 
    Supra note 27 at para. 39.
33 
    Ibid. at para. 14.
34 
    Supra note 2 at para. 57. For a discussion of the source of the provincial duty, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal 
Rights, Resource Development, and the Source of the Provincial Duty to Consult in Haida Nation and Taku 
River” (2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 447.
35 
    See







    Liability of the Crown, 3d ed. (Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd, 2000) point out 
that this principle was established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Wardle v. Manitoba Farm Loans Association 
[1956] S.C.R. 3 at 10, 18, 23. 
37 
    Crown Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 89, s. 2(c) and Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 
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framework38 which was enacted to form the tort liability provisions in the provinc-
es.39 The federal Crown has partially enacted this framework.40 The provision in the 
British Columbia statute is less elaborate. It incorporates the general Uniform Model 
Act framework but without the specific list included by the other Provinces.41 In any 
event, the provincial and federal statutes purport to expose the Crown to liability in 
tort as though it were a private person. 
In practice, however, the courts have recognized that suing the Crown in negli-
gence raises unique issues. The Crown will not be liable in tort where activities 
are covered by an express legislative exemption or where damage results from an 
impugned policy decision. Just v. British Columbia [Just] established this.42 a deci-






















of the most significant potential barriers to the cause of action at issue. These bases 
of exclusion are not insurmountable, however, and are addressed below under the 
heading “Residual Policy Considerations.”
In short, armed with statutory authorization and an awareness of the special is-
sues which arise when an action in negligence is brought against the Crown, a pri-
vate party could employ the common law negligence framework to assert a claim. 
To succeed, of course, a plaintiff would have to establish legal duty, breach of the 
standard of care, causation, proximate cause, and damage.45 These five elements 
will be analyzed below in the context of Crown failure to consult and accommodate 
First Nations with resultant loss to an innocent private party. 
C-50, s. 3(a).
38 
    Ibid. at 112. Section 5(1) of the Uniform Model Act stated:the Crown is subject to all those liabilities in tort to 

















  (b) in respect of any breach of those duties that a person owes to his servants or agents by reason of  




















  control of property; and under any statute, or under any regulation or by-law made or passed 
  under the authority of any statute.
39 
    Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. P-18, s. 5. Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.S. 1978, 
c. P-27, s. 5. The Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P140, s. 4. Proceedings Against the Crown Act, 
R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5. Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-18, s. 4. Crown Proceedings Act, 
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-32, s. 4. Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. P-26, s. 5. Proceedings against the 
Crown Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 360, s. 5.
40 
    Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, supra note 36.
41 












    [Just cited to S.C.R.]:
In the case of a government agency, exemption from this imposition of duty may occur as a result of an explicit 
statutory exemption.  Alternatively, the exemption may arise as a result of the nature of the decision made by 
the government agency.  That is, a government agency will be exempt from the imposition of a duty of care in 














































and Judicial Challenges” in E. Hughes, A.R. Lucas & W.A. Tilleman, eds., Environmental Law and Policy, 3d ed. 
(Toronto: Emond Publications Limited, 2003).
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A.
    Legal Duty of the Crown to Private Parties
The first issue to be addressed is whether the Crown, in issuing a project authori-
zation to a private party, owes a duty of care to that private party where there is 
an underlying consultation requirement. Such a duty is not currently established 
in law.46 However, the categories of negligence are not closed47 and a novel duty 
of care could be recognized. Drawing on Anns v. Merton London Borough Council 
[Anns],48 the Supreme Court of Canada in Kamloops v. Nielsen [Kamloops] laid out a 
two-stage test for establishing duty of care.49 
This test was elaborated in Cooper v. Hobart50 and has since been further refined. 
Most recently, its development has been encapsulated in Canada v. Design Services 
Ltd.,51 a case dealing with the liability of Public Works and Government Services 
Canada to third parties in a tendering process.  A duty of care will be found to exist 
if the following requirements are met: (1) reasonably foreseeable harm; (2) suffi-
cient proximity; (3) policy reasons arising from the particular relationship between 
the parties which militate in favour of the recognition of a new duty of care, where 
no existing analogous categories of duty of care exist; and (4) absence of residual 
policy considerations sufficient to justify restriction of liability.52 An application of 
relevant facts from Haida, Blaney, Betsiamites and Taku to the current conceptualiza-
tion of the Anns test will shed light on whether the Crown could be found to owe a 






The reasonable foreseeability of harm to a private party flowing from a Crown au-
thorization made without adequate consultation would likely carry two require-
ments. First, it would have to be reasonably foreseeable that authorization without 
consultation could, in a general sense, result in a successful Haida motion and en-
46 
    Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537, 2001 SCC 79, 206 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at para. 36. The Court recognized 
several established categories, none which deal with the issuance of permits and licenses to a third party where 
First Nation consultation is a condition precedent. The joint venture category was more recently recognized, 
although not held to exist on the particular facts, in Design Services, infra note 50 at para. 67. It is possible that 
private parties authorized by the Crown to carry out resource extraction activities could be “closely managed” 
by the Crown in certain cases. Where this is the case, to the extent that the undertaking can be considered a 




































































































































stage of the Anns test, the question still remains whether there are residual policy considerations outside the 
relationship of the parties that may negative the imposition of a duty of care.
51 
    Canada v. Design Services Ltd., [2006] F.C.J. No. 1141, 2006 FCA 260, leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, [2006] 























    Cooper that the prima facie 
prong of Anns requires both reasonable foreseeability and proximity. Accordingly, the two analyses are sepa-
rated here.
52 
    Ibid. at para. 46.
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suing private party loss. Based on the reasoning in Childs v. Desormeaux [Childs],53 
however, this fact alone would be insufficient to establish reasonable foreseeability 
of harm. In Childs, the reasonable foreseeability that impaired driving generally can 
result in a motor vehicle accident and serious third party injury failed to establish 
that third party injury is necessarily reasonably foreseeable to a social host whose 
particular guest drinks and drives. The court held that there must be a “finding that 
the hosts knew, or ought to have known, that the guest who was about to drive was 
impaired.”54 This particularity of focus is the second requirement that would have 
to be met. Thus, a duty of care will only be found if the Crown could have reasona-
bly foreseen that a particular private party authorization triggers a duty to consult.
As noted in Part I, Haida and Taku clearly articulated the conditions that trigger a 
duty to consult.55 These decisions were rendered on November 18, 2004, so that 
where the trigger conditions are present after this date, and the Crown is aware or 
ought to be aware of them, it will be reasonably foreseeable that the Crown has a 
duty to consult.56 
The Crown will often have subjective knowledge of the trigger conditions. In Taku 
and Blaney, for example, the Crown was found to have real knowledge of the claims 
asserted by the TRTFN and Homalco because of these groups’ involvement with 
the B.C. Treaty Commission. 57 In other cases, the reasonable foreseeability of the 
duty to consult will be satisfied where it can be shown that the Crown must have 
known that an authorization would adversely affect Aboriginal rights. In Haida, for 
example, given that the Crown had access to evidence that cedar trees had been of 
significance to Haida culture for hundreds of years,58 a Crown permit authorizing 
the harvesting of cedar carried both the objective potential for adverse effects and 
the reasonable foreseeability of adverse effects. The objective potential of adverse 
effects triggers the duty to consult. The reasonable foreseeability of the adverse 
effects goes to the reasonable foreseeability that there is a duty to consult in the 
particular case as required by Anns.
The potential existence of an Aboriginal right or title could be said to not always be 
reasonably foreseeable on the basis that, under the Haida test, the Crown may have 
a duty to consult without having actual knowledge of this duty.59 Thus, Crown au-
thorization may adversely affect Aboriginal rights or title without the Crown being 
subjectively aware of its duty. This difficulty has been noted in the context of the 
overall workability of the Haida test. In particular, the test has been criticized on the 
basis that “it can fairly be asked how the Crown can be said to have knowledge of 
53 
    Childs v. Desormeaux, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, 2006 SCC 18 [Childs].
54 
    Ibid. at para. 28.
55 
















56  This is likely a generous temporal allowance in favour of the Crown, considering the words of Powers J. in Blaney, 
supra note 6 at para. 129. “[T]he recognition of the obligation to consult is not a new one and did not arise simply out 
of the Supreme Court of Canada decisions referred to. The obligation to consult has been recognized by the courts for a 
considerable period of time, and the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in Haida certainly made it clear that the 







































    or constructive knowledge. 
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an [a]boriginal right when the existence of the right has not been demonstrated” at 
law.60 However, the constructive knowledge threshold in the Haida test probably 
corresponds with the reasonable foreseeability standard set in the first stage of the 
Anns test. Where knowledge of the asserted claim is constructive, it would still fall 
within the reasonable foreseeability ambit of Anns because constructive knowledge 
will require facts sufficient to instil a reasonable belief that the claim exists. If it is 
not reasonably foreseeable that Aboriginal claims have been asserted in relation to 
a particular area, there can be no constructive knowledge. 
Nor does the standard set by the second requirement of the duty to consult (knowl-
edge of a potential adverse effect) offend reasonable foreseeability. If Crown au-
thorization of an activity that is likely to adversely affect Aboriginal rights takes the 
form of an environmental assessment approval, for example, there is a duty to con-
sult and that duty will be reasonably foreseeable. Due to its specific nature, an au-
thorization in the form of an environmental assessment approval discloses whether 
an undertaking is likely to adversely affect Aboriginal rights. Pursuant to s. 9 of the 
Environmental Assessment Act,61 which was the foundation of the impugned Crown 
decision-making process in Taku, a project committee was formed which ordered 
the proponent to produce a project report describing in detail its proposed under-
taking. This report was reviewed and assessed by various qualified working groups 
of the project committee. There can thus be no argument that the potential effects 
of the project were unknown. If an approval to carry out an undertaking did not 
require the Crown to be informed of the nature and extent of that undertaking, it 
would not be an approval of the undertaking. 
It is true that the reasonable foreseeability of adverse effects on Aboriginal rights 
will not always be as clear-cut as in Taku and Haida. In Blaney, the impugned deci-
sion was the amendment of a fish farm licence allowing for the introduction of 
Atlantic salmon. The Crown took the position that there was no actual risk of in-
fringement of Homalco rights or title claims.62 However, this position was based on 
the lack of conclusive evidence confirming the risk rather than the existence of evi-
dence discounting the risk. It was found that the Crown was contemplating activity 
which might affect Homalco rights and that therefore there was a duty to consult. 
The issue is therefore whether the Crown’s failure to consult under such circum-
stances could give rise to a claim in negligence. The Crown after all had no definitive 
reason to believe that consultation was necessary. However, in this case, the Homa-
lco did provide enough evidence to meet the reasonable foreseeability threshold. 
They had communicated the potential risks to the Crown, which included: “Spread 
of disease; Spread of parasites such as sea lice; Introduction of non-native species, 
being Atlantic salmon and potential escapements and competition with wild salm-
on; Destruction of mammals attempting to feed or feeding at the net pens; Pollution 
from waste feed, excrement, pesticides, antibiotics.”63 The Homalco substantiated 
these risks to varying degrees with evidence proffered before the Ministry made 
its decision to grant the amendment to the licence. For example, the Homalco sup-
plied a report by a fisheries biologist who concluded that the potential for escaped 
60 
    Sla ery,
    supra note 11 at 441.
61 
    Supra note 14.
62 
    Supra note 6 at para. 54.
63 
    Blaney at para. 59.
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Atlantic salmon would create new environmental risks in the area. So, even where 
the duty to consult is less obvious, it may be reasonably foreseeable that it exists. 
It must be admitted, however, that where the evidence of adverse effect is less clear, 
a duty to consult may exist without such duty being reasonably foreseeable. Where 
this is the case, harm to the private party will not be reasonably foreseeable and no 
duty of care on the part of the Crown to the private party with respect to the con-
sultation requirement will be found.     
Another argument can be made that, even where Crown duty to consult is reason-
ably foreseeable, it may not be reasonably foreseeable that failure to consult could 
result in damage to a private party. This argument would hinge on the reasonable 
foreseeability of injunctive relief arising from a successful Haida motion. For it is 
injunctive relief that causes third party loss64 yet injunctive relief will not always be 
ordered on a successful Haida motion.65 Injunctive relief was, however, granted by 
the Supreme Courts of British Columbia and Quebec in Blaney and Betsiamites, and 
this testifies to the reality that it is reasonably foreseeable that a successful Haida 
motion could result in the restriction of private party activities.66 In circumstances 
where the Crown issues a licence or approval to a private party, the private party 





As reasonable foreseeability and proximity are distinct requirements of the Anns 
test, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate sufficient proximity.67 That is, the 
claimant would need to show that the Crown “was in a close and direct relationship 
to [the private party] such that it is just to impose a duty of care in the circumstanc-
es.” 68 Further, “factors giving rise to proximity must be grounded in the governing 
statute when there is one.”69 A close reading of this test indicates that a thorough 
proximity analysis requires a close and direct relationship and the existence of in-
ter-relational policy issues that support the finding of a duty of care being just in the 
circumstances. When the Crown issues a specific authorization to a private party 
pursuant to statute, a legal relationship is formed that goes beyond the relationship 
the Crown might have with the public at large or even with the natural resource 




















































































    Betsiamites by the Supreme Court of Que-
bec was overturned by the Quebec Court of Appeal in Betsiamites, ibid., the reality is that courts are willing to 
grant injunctive relief on Haida motions.
67 
    Design Services, supra note 50 at para. 45. See also Cooper, supra note 45 at para. 42.
68 




from the specific and direct nature of Crown authorizations. In Betsiamites, the 
Crown had authorized an amendment to a government-issued forest management 
contract belonging to a private party (Kruger).70 Forest management contracts in 
Quebec are issued pursuant to the Forest Act, which states that the contract holder 
is entitled to supply wood-processing plants with lumber from specified areas in 
consideration for performance of the conditions of the contract and the Act.71
Kruger may have had a cause of action in contract had the injunction not been lifted 
on appeal, but this would not have precluded a cause of action in tort.72 In fact, 
the existence of a contract can serve to demonstrate that the relationship between 
the parties is of sufficient proximity to warrant the imposition of a duty of care. 
According to the majority in BG Checo International Ltd. v. British Columbia Hydro 
and Power Authority, the particulars of a contract signify the nature of the relation-
ship in which there is a duty of care.73 Pursuant to the Forest Act, the contract in 
Betsiamites described the management area from which Kruger was permitted to 
harvest trees to supply wood-processing plants. The relationship between parties 
in such circumstances is likely sufficiently proximate to allow for the imposition of 
a duty of care, at least with respect to the certifications made by the government in 
the contract. 
Certifications made in non-contractual Crown authorizations also go to the factors 
identified in Odhavji as being salient at this stage of the analysis.74 These factors 
include the expectations of the parties, representations, and reliance. 
Natural resource activity authorizations constitute representations that private par-
ties may undertake specified operations in certain named areas. They import rea-
sonable expectations that the necessary conditions precedent have been discharged 
and result in the level of reliance necessary for the fulfilment of the terms of the 
authorization. In Blaney, the Minister-approved amendment to the existing aquac-
ulture facility licence was not a contract. However, a licence amendment does create 
a close and direct relationship analogous to the one in Betsiamites. The amendments 
in Betsiamites and Blaney allowed a specifically identified private company (Kruger, 
Marine Harvest) to carry out a particular type of activity (logging, Atlantic salmon 
fish-farming) in a specific area under Crown control. This created a close and direct 




The imposition of a duty of care must also be supported by justification in the form 
of policy reasons arising from the particular relationship between the parties.75 The 
restraint of private natural resource-based activities due to Crown failure to consult 
effectively shifts the consequences of the Crown’s failure to consult onto private 





71 Forest Act, R.S.Q., s. 102.3 c. F-4.1.
72    See Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1206. This case stands for the principle that parties may sue in 











    [BG Checo cited to S.C.R.]. 
74 Supra note 26 at para. 50.
75 Cooper, supra note 45.
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with the Crown.76 The extension of a duty of care is just in these circumstances so 
that the party with whom no duty lies does not bear the cost of the failure of an-
other party to whom such duty clearly attaches.
The relationship between the parties in Blaney exemplifies this inter-relational pub-
lic policy reason for imposing a duty of care. As a private party, Marine Harvest was 
relieved by the Supreme Court of Canada of any duty to consult First Nations. Yet 
it was Marine Harvest that bore the practical consequences of the Crown’s failure to 
consult the Homalco. Furthermore, the Court’s declaration made it clear that Marine 
Harvest’s licence to farm Atlantic salmon might very well be revoked permanently 
rather than just temporarily suspended.77 If this happened, the unfairness would be 
even more obvious. Power J. noted that “Marine Harvest, as a third party, has relied 
on the decision, and would suffer significant damages if the decision was quashed 
and the salmon requested to be removed.”78 Enjoining the activities of a third party 
who has proceeded in good faith and to its detriment on the basis of a government 
authorization can cause damage to the private party that is tantamount to indirectly 






The second prong of the Anns test involves consideration of whether there are leg-
islative or judicial policy reasons external to the relationship of the parties that pre-
clude the establishment of a duty of care. The evidentiary burden at this stage is on 
the Crown79 If the answer is yes, there is no duty of care and therefore, can be no 
claim in negligence. There are three primary policy considerations, two of which 
have already been noted as having been identified in Just,80 which could limit or 
negative the duty of care: (1) if there is a legislative exemption;81 (2) if the impugned 
Crown authorization was a policy decision;82 and (3) if the private party has experi-
enced pure economic loss. Each consideration will be analyzed in turn.
None of the cases discussed in this paper (Haida, Taku, Betsiamites and Blaney) in-
volve statutes which explicitly exempt the Crown from liability for authorization 
decisions.83 Other authorizing statutes, however, may contain such an exemption.
A decision made on the policy level carries sufficiently compelling public policy 
considerations to negative a duty of care.84 Even if made in error the decision will 
76 See
    Haida, supra note 2 at para. 56.



















necessary to do so.” 






























the party asserting a point should be required to establish it.”
80 Supra note 41.
81 Ibid.
82 Cooper, supra note 45 at para. 38. “It is at this second stage of the analysis that the distinction between govern-
ment policy and execution of policy falls to be considered.”
83 See
    Forest Act, supra note 16; Environmental Assessment Act, supra note 14; Forest Act, supra note 69; Fisheries 










    Swinamer, supra note 42; Brown, supra note 43; Just, supra note 
41. “The duty of care should apply to a public authority unless there is a valid basis for its exclusion. A true policy 
decision undertaken by a government agency constitutes such a valid basis for exclusion,” quoted fromCooper, 
supra note 45 at para. 38. “It is at this second stage of the analysis that the distinction between government policy 
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stand, as long as it was not made in bad faith or for an improper purpose.85 The 
issue at this point, then, becomes whether a Crown authorization of a natural re-
source-based activity was operational or policy in nature. If an authorization was 
clearly legislative, akin to the passage of a general by-law, there will be no difficulty 
characterizing it as a matter of policy.86 On the other hand, if a structured statutory 
schedule governed the decision to authorize, as was the case in Just where highway 
inspections were carried out pursuant to established technical schedules, the deci-
sion will be seen to be clearly operational.87 The authorizations in Blaney and Bet-
siamites, however, were discretionary amendments to an existing licence and con-
tract, and were neither legislative nor clearly governed by a rigid statutory regime.
These Crown decisions to authorize lie in an area where there may be only slight 
differences between what constitutes policy and what constitutes operation. In 
such cases, Hogg has suggested that operational decisions can be distinguished on 
the basis that they are more specific and therefore amenable to scrutiny in relation 
to a standard of care.88 Decisions to authorize must therefore be assessed with this 
in mind.
In Blaney, Marine Harvest was granted an amendment to its aquaculture licence 
pursuant to s. 13(5) of the Fisheries Act. This provision fetters discretion only to the 
extent that a licence issuance requires payment of the prescribed fee.89 This suggests 
that the decision to grant a licence is general and highly discretionary, for no opera-
tional structure or decision-making procedure is provided in the statute. However, 
the B.C. Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries’ Marine Finfish Aquaculture Poli-
cies and Procedures for Licensing Applications do state that applications which have 
the potential to impact Aboriginal rights require consultation in compliance with 
the “applicable First Nations consultation protocols.”90 The applicable protocol is 
the Provincial Policy for Consultation with First Nations. Under Part C: Operational 
Guidelines it is stated that:
The Province recognizes the need to streamline existing consultation proc-
esses and incorporate the consideration of Aboriginal interests into Provin-












thorizations being made.91   
and execution of policy falls to be considered. It is established that government actors are not liable in negligence 
for policy decisions, but only operation decisions”; Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Greater Winnipeg, [1971] S.C.R. 957 at 
970 [Welbridge cited to S.C.R.]. “[T]he risk of loss from the exercise of legislative or adjudicative authority is a gen-
eral public risk and not one for which compensation can be supported on the basis of a private duty of care.”   
85 
    Odhavji, supra note 26. See also Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121 at paras. 44-46. Rand J. held that direc-
tions provided pursuant to statutory authority may give rise to an action for damages where made in bad faith 
or for an improper purpose as in this case where a liquor license was revoked by a statutory body on the basis of 





    Welbridge, supra note 82. 
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Supra note 41.
88 
    Hogg and Monohan, supra note 35 at 164.  
89 
    Blaney supra note 22 at s. 13(5):
  A person must not carry on the business of aquaculture at any location or facility in British 
  Columbia or its coastal waters unless the person holds a license issued for that purpose 
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The protocol goes on to lay out a detailed stage-by-stage procedure that Crown de-
cision makers are to follow when considering whether to issue authorizations. The 
direction provided by the protocol is consistent with Haida.92 McLachlin C.J. also 
referred to it in Haida, stating that “while falling short of a regulatory scheme, [the 
protocol] may guard against unstructured discretion and provide a guide for deci-
sion makers.”93 It is important to note that British Columbia is not the only province 
which has expressly taken the policy decision to structure ministerial consultation 
processes.94 A strong argument could be made that decisions in Alberta, Saskatch-
ewan and Ontario to issue natural resource industry undertaking authorizations 
without adequate underlying consultation are also operational, for the same rea-
sons. The reduction of unstructured discretion specifies the nature of the decision 
in accordance with Hogg’s above-mentioned indicator of susceptibility to judicial 
scrutiny.
In Blaney, then, the decision to authorize may have had policy aspects but the con-
sultation aspect was operational and thus potentially subject to a duty of care. The 
Crown made a policy decision to impose the protocol on its decision makers. The 
decision as to whether or not to impose the protocol, however it was made, would 
escape the duty of care because it was itself policy.95 But now that this policy deci-
sion to require consultation has been put in place, along with the Operational Pro-
cedures to guide the decision-making process, the Crown cannot escape liability by 
arguing that there is no duty of care. 
A decision to issue an authorization without consultation is operational in that it 
incorrectly applies the protocol.96 A final policy factor considers pure economic loss. 
Private party damage such as that experienced in Blaney and Betsiamites is likely to 
be categorized as pure economic loss, which is often held to be non-recoverable.97 
However courts will inquire into whether pure economic loss may be compensable 
in negligence by analyzing the particular case with reference to the applicable prin-
















culture Industry” (2005) 14 Dal. J. Leg. Stud. 146 at 153.
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The Government of Alberta’s First Nation Consultation Policy on Land Manage-
ment and Resource Development (Edmonton: Government of Alberta Ministry of Aboriginal Relations, 2005) 
at 3. The third Guiding Principle in Alberta’s policy states that, “consultation will occur before decisions are 
made, where Land Management and Resource Development may infringe First Nations rights and traditional 
uses.” Alberta’s Policy goes on to describe consultation procedures. See also Government of Saskatchewan, 
Government of Saskatchewan Guidelines for Consultation with First Nations and Metis People: A Guide For Decision 
Makers (Regina: Ministry of First Nations and Metis Relations, 2006). Based on the current law, the Saskatch-






































































































held that the decisions as to when to inspect were policy but once they had been taken and a plan for inspection 
had been put in place, the decisions as to whether or not to follow this plan were application of policy and thus 
operational. 







































ciples under which pure economic loss is recoverable.98 
Reliance is the principle that should apply to the loss experienced by private par-
ties in cases like Blaney and Betsiamites. According to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal in Kripps, pure economic loss may be recoverable where the court can infer 
there has been an undertaking by the defendant to look after the plaintiff’s eco-
nomic interests.99 Such an undertaking will be indicated by (1) a situation in which 
the defendant had actual or presumed knowledge that the plaintiff might rely on 
it to look after its economic interests; (2) actual reliance; and (3) reliance that was 
reasonable in the particular case.100
In Betsiamites, the terms of the forest management contract provided to Kruger by 
the Crown created such a situation. Pursuant to s. 102.3 of the Forest Act,101 the 
government of Quebec issued an amended forest management contract to Kruger 
which identified the area from which Kruger would be entitled to harvest timber 
for one hundred years. Kruger relied on the contract by establishing forestry activi-
ties in the management area. It was certainly reasonable to do this because that area 
was covered under the contract. The Forest Act also indicates that the Crown, by 
providing a forest management contract, shares responsibility for economic devel-
opment with the recipient of the contract.102 Under these circumstances the Crown 
ought to have known that Kruger was relying on the fact that the Crown would not 
squander Kruger’s economic interests under the contract because to do so would be 
to squander the economic interests of the province of Quebec.
B.
    Breach of Standard of Care
In the absence of expressed legislative exemption and if the decision to authorize 
is deemed operational, a duty of care may be established. At this point the analysis 
conflates with the traditional approach to negligence.103 The private party must es-
tablish a breach of the applicable standard of care. For these purposes, it is appro-
priate to adopt the standard of care required by Major J. in Ryan v. Victoria, which 
is that of the ordinary reasonably prudent person in like circumstances.104 Thus, the 
standard of care required where the Crown grants a resource activity authorization 
to a private party will depend on the type of authorization granted and other sur-
rounding circumstances. 
The Crown complied with the empowering statutes in issuing the authorizations in 
Blaney and Betsiamites. Neither the Fisheries Act105 nor the Forest Act106 was violated 
and statutory compliance is evidence of reasonable care.107 It would also appear that 
98    Ibid. 
99 Ibid.
100   Ibid. 
101   Supra note 69.
102   Ibid., S. 102 states that in entering into this contract, the Minister would be, “entrust[ing] [Kruger] with the 
management of forest areas to promote economic development.”























agency and no exemption by way of statute or policy decision-making is found to exist, a traditional torts analysis 







    (City), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 201, 168 D.L.R. (4th) 513 at para. 28.
105 
    Supra note 22. 
106 
    Supra note 16. 
107 
    R. in Right of Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205, 143 D.L.R. (3d) 9 at 222 [Wheat Pool 
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the issuance of an authorization lacking requisite consultation by the federal Crown 
pursuant to the Fisheries Act108 would not explicitly violate that Act. The power of 
the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to decide when to issue commercial fishery 











    Oceans) as highly discretionary.109 Consequently, in a case like 
this, the Crown could argue that statutory compliance establishes that its conduct 
did not fall below the applicable standard of care. But statutory compliance is not 
determinative. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that statutory compliance 
alone does not preclude a finding of breach of standard of care, especially where a 
statute is general, discretionary or “where unusual circumstances exist which are 
not clearly within the scope of the statute.”110 The Fisheries and Forest Acts bestow a 
general and discretionary power on the Crown regarding issuance of aquaculture 
licences111 and forest management contracts respectively.112 
Further, these Acts do not address the special circumstances created where an au-
thorization carries an underlying duty to consult. Statutory compliance will not 
evidence reasonable care where the legislative standards do not govern the par-
ticular facts.113 If intentional or negligent failure to comply with a statutory duty 
is evidence of breach of standard of care114 then, surely, failure to comply with a 
constitutional duty is even stronger evidence. Although the duty to consult is not 
a statutory duty, it is a legal duty,115 and one that arises from the Constitution Act, 
1982.116 A strong argument could be made that Crown failure to comply with a legal 
duty arising from the ‘supreme law of the land’ is a failure which brings Crown 
authorization of private party activity without adequate consultation below the 
standard of care.   
Haida and Taku clearly articulate what the Crown must do to comply with its con-
stitutional duty to consult. The applicable standard of care with respect to the scope 
of required consultation might well coincide with the Haida and Taku framework. 
On successful Haida motions, courts order consultation that is consonant with these 
cases. In Blaney it was held that “[e]ach of the parties to the consultation can take di-
rection respecting rights and obligations from these decisions.”117 In all cases, then, 
the standard of care should require a good faith attempt by the Crown to consult 
in accordance with its duty to do so prior to the authorization of a private party 
undertaking.118
The type of consultation required of the Crown when making decisions to authorize 
cited to S.C.R.].
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issued that the Fisheries Act imposes limits upon the Minister’s discretion.” 
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Supra note 16, 68. Section 102 of the Forest Act provides only this minimal guidance:
 The Minister may, on such conditions as he may determine, enter into a contract by which he entrusts a person 
with management of forest areas to promote economic development.
113 
    Ryan, supra note 101.
114 
    See Wheat Pool, supra note 104.
115 
    Haida, supra note 2 at para. 10.
116  Ibid.
117 
    Supra note 6 at para. 129.
118 Haida, supra note 2 at para. 41. 
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private party activity in the context of the British Columbia aquaculture industry 
is indicative of the applicable standard of care in that context. Many First Nations 
in British Columbia can make a strong claim to a right to fish for wild salmon and 
the potential risk to this right posed by offshore aquaculture facilities is substan-
tial.119 Under these circumstances, it has been suggested that the Crown’s obligation 
is to mitigate the adverse effects of interference with asserted Aboriginal rights.120 
This is the level of positive action required for the Crown to fulfil its constitutional 
obligation to consult. This should also calibrate the standard of care required of 
the reasonably prudent Crown prior to issuing an authorization to an aquaculture 
facility operator.  
In reality, the scope of the duty set out by the Haida framework is no more onerous 
than the common law standard of reasonable prudence. Haida makes it clear that 
it is not perfect consultation, just reasonable consultation that is required.121 Where 
the Crown has attempted to consult and does not do so adequately, a Haida motion 
will only be successful if the Crown’s attempt falls well below the standard of rea-
sonable prudence. It is likely, then, that where a Crown authorization is invalidated 
on a Haida Motion, the Crown has been negligent.
C.
    Causation
Sufficiency of the causal link between the negligence of the Crown and damage 
constitutes the next element. The “but for” test is the applicable standard. Although 
there has been some obfuscation in the jurisprudence as to whether this is so, the 
recent holding of the Supreme Court of Canada in Resurfice Corp v. Hanke [Hanke] 
clarifies the point that, even in multi-cause scenarios, “the basic test for determin-
ing causation remains the ‘but for’ test. The plaintiff bears the burden of showing 
that ‘but for’ the negligent act or omission of each defendant, the injury would not 
have occurred.”122
Common sense dictates that, but for the Crown’s failure to carry out its legal duty 
to consult, the damage experienced by Marine Harvest in Blaney would not have 
occurred. And “ordinary common sense” is the mechanism for drawing causal in-
ferences in this context.123 Notwithstanding the invalidity of the authorization due 
to the failure to consult, Marine Harvest had taken all required measures to allow 
for the addition of the smolts. Indeed, most of the smolts had already been added 
and the rest were simply waiting.


































































































































the (but for) test” (at para. 25). As is noted in the ensuing analysis, the Crown permit is the root cause of the 
private party damage. Without the permit, the damage could never occur.
123 See
    Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 235 at para. 16 [Athey].
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of compensable damage. In Blaney, for example, if good faith consultation between 
the Crown and the Homalco results in a withdrawal of the permit, not all projected 
damages will be caused by the Crown’s negligence. Certainly the cost of remov-
ing the 700,000 smolts ($300,000) will be caused by the Crown’s failure to consult 
because the smolts would not have been added but for the negligently issued per-
mit. However, the resulting loss in potential earnings (estimated at $15,000,000) 
will likely go unrecovered based on the “essential purpose of tort law, which is to 
restore the plaintiff to the position he would have enjoyed but for the negligence of 
the defendant.”124  If the Crown had never issued the permit those potential earn-
ings would not have been actualized anyway.
There is no room at the causation stage for the objection that the failure of a private 
party to inspect permits for requisite consultation negates causation. This would 
amount to an argument of comparative blameworthiness at the causation stage – an 
approach squarely rejected in Hanke.125 Comparative blameworthiness does not en-
ter the analysis until the causation threshold is met, at which point it is subsumed 
into any applicable contributory negligence assessment. 
However, a private party permit inspection argument, even if properly handled 
under contributory negligence, should ultimately fail in reducing the quantum of 
liability. To hold otherwise would require reversal of the established principle that 
“[i]f the defendant’s conduct is found to be a cause of the injury, the presence of 
other non-tortious contributing causes does not reduce the extent of the defend-
ant’s liability.”126 In Kamloops the defendant City had a legal duty to enforce the 
prohibition of occupancy of a home that did not meet the foundational integrity 
requirements of the relevant by-law.127 Due to the fact that inspections were the 
responsibility of the City, it was held that there was no obligation on the plaintiff to 
verify the integrity of the foundation. Similarly, in the duty to consult cases, it has 
been stressed that the duty lies not with private parties but with the Crown and it is 
not the responsibility of private parties to ensure that Crown authorizations
carry the requisite consultation.
 
D. Proximate Cause
Crown liability for damages will be limited if the proximate cause cannot be estab-
lished. The test for injunctive relief on a Haida motion distances the act of Crown au-
thorization from the loss experienced by the private party as a result of a restriction 
of activities. Injunctive relief on a Haida motion is far from a guaranteed result. Re-
striction of private party operations is a remedy that is only granted after a careful 
balancing of inconvenience.128 It could be argued that the decision of a First Nation 
to initiate a Haida motion coupled with a Court’s decision to grant such an applica-
tion are intervening forces rendering the Crown’s failure to consult too remote. 











    Ltd., that “the essential factor in determining liability 
124 Hanke supra note 118 at para. 19.
125 Ibid. at paras. 15-17, 21.
126 Athey, supra note 119 at para. 12. 
127 Ibid.
128 Haida, supra note 2 at para. 14.
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is whether the damage is of such a kind as the reasonable man should have fore-
seen” rather than the presence or absence of directness.129 Haida lays out for all to 
see the circumstances that create a duty to consult and the possible consequences of 
a failure to comply with this duty. As a result of Haida principles, injunctive relief on 
a successful Haida motion caused damage to private parties in Blaney and initially in 
Betsiamites. In the wake of the Supreme Court of Canada and the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal130 decisions in Haida, the chain of events that resulted in damage to 
Marine Harvest and, initially, Kruger, cannot be considered unusual. The outcome 
in both cases was the logical result of Crown authorization without consultation 
and it can be expected to occur again where the Crown fails to consult.
E.
    Damage
Plaintiffs alleging negligence must demonstrate damage.131 A successful Haida mo-
tion may result in an injunction against resource-based activities and various losses 
warranting compensation. It would be reasonable to expect cessation or delay of 
natural resource-based activities to lead to stand-by costs for equipment and work-
ers, deterioration of allocated natural resources, and losses for breach of contractual 
obligations to secondary manufacturers. In overturning the interlocutory injunction 
in Betsiamites, the Quebec Court of Appeal acknowledged the obvious damage to 
Kruger that would result if its operations were enjoined for any significant period 
of time (the project had required very large investments).132 In Blaney, the success-
ful Haida motion resulted in a partial injunction.133 Marine Harvest was forced to 
transport fish to other fish farms at a cost. Enjoined businesses in similar positions 
would have little difficulty meeting the damage requirement
CONCLUSION
As lower courts refine the Haida framework through application, inequity is emerg-
ing. The cost of the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate First Nations is being 
externalized onto innocent third parties. Such parties have not asserted sovereignty 
over the land yet they bear the consequences of the Crown having done so. This 
paper makes the qualified assertion that a cause of action in negligence against the 
Crown may exist when third parties suffer loss due to Crown failure to adequately 
consult and accommodate First Nations. 
For such an action to succeed, the Crown’s authorization of the third party activ-
ity in question will likely need to have occurred after Haida and Taku, for these 
decisions rendered the duty to consult reasonably foreseeable in most cases. Fur-
ther, any licences, permits or approvals granting permission to the private party to 
carry out resource extraction activities will have to be specific and clearly defined 


















    Forests) (2002), 216 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2002 BCCA 462. The Court of 
Appeal was even more demanding than the Supreme Court of Canada in terms of its view of the Crown’s duty 
to consult.
131 
    Vile v. Von Wendt (1979), 26 O.R. (2d) 513 at 517. Damage is a “head of loss for which compensation will be 
awarded.”
132 
    Supra note 64 at para. 88.
133 
    Supra note 6 at para. 127.
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authorization will need to have been executive and operational rather than legis-
lative. The enabling legislation cannot contain a preclusive exemption. Addition-
ally, where damage to the third party is in the form of pure economic loss, reliance 
should be demonstrable. 
If Crown-authorized private activities are enjoined due to the Crown’s failure to 
make a reasonable attempt at discharging its clearly defined constitutional duty 
then the Crown may have been negligent. This is particularly so on the facts in cases 
like Blaney, where the Crown, having ignored its clearly defined constitutional ob-
ligation, is ordered by a court to go back and comply while an innocent third party 
suffers loss.   
